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Yale Program on Financial Stability 
Lessons Learned 
 
 Matthew Kabaker 
By Yasemin Esmen 
During the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-09, Matthew Kabaker was senior adviser to 
Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner and Treasury deputy assistant secretary, capital 
markets. He helped design the Treasury’s policy response to the financial crisis; design and 
implement the Dodd-Frank financial reforms; and address housing finance reform, including 
reforms at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Mr. Kabaker also served on the Treasury’s Financial 
Stability Policy Council and Housing Policy Council. This Lessons Learned summary is based 
on an interview with Mr. Kabaker. 
Designing the correct solution requires, at the core, getting a handle on the real 
underlying issues and applying innovation and flexibility within the given 
constraints. And then, you still have to have a back-up plan. 
On October 14, 2008, Treasury announced the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), which was 
funded by the recently enacted Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP).1 Under the CPP 
(which was available to most banks), Treasury would invest capital into banks, which 
voluntarily agreed to participate, by purchasing up to $250 billion of preferred stock. 
Treasury announced that nine large financial institutions had already agreed to participate 
in the program. The CPP was designed to encourage banks to build capital (by encouraging 
private investment) and increase the flow of credit to businesses and household. 
Kabaker shared that by December 2008, “it was increasingly clear, both from market 
signals and bank behavior, that we had a solvency, not a liquidity crisis, and that the 
solvency response which had occurred by that point [the initial TARP capital injections] 
was not having an effect on the perception of solvency.” The terms of that preferred stock, 
including certain behavioral restrictions and a step up interest, Kabaker explained, caused 
it to be “viewed by the bank and market as temporary capital at best,” more as a liability 
even though it was in the form of preferred stock. 
This perception was significant, according to Kabaker, because it was a roadblock to the 
private sector investing in the banks. The private sector had more capital potential than the 
TARP budget and had the potential for its investment to be self-perpetuating if it 
participated in the recapitalization process; but this wasn’t happening. Therefore, Kabaker 
recalled, the first thing the policymakers did was to identify the reasons why the private 
sector was not already participating in the process: 
There was a moment in the crisis, in the summer of 2008, where the private sector 
did participate in bank recapitalization, and many of those early investments were 
burned. They were premature and people lost money, and so the private sector was 
 
1 Treasury Announces TARP Capital Purchase Program Description.” October 14, 2008. 
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1207.aspx. 
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essentially on strike. Our conclusion was that this was principally as a result of 
uncertainty about the extent of losses of the banks themselves, and policy 
uncertainty around how the government would behave. 
Uncertainty equals volatility, said Kabaker, so understanding this perception and the other 
underlying reasons why the private sector was reluctant to invest in the banks was key to 
the government being able to design a strategy that would mobilize private capital. These 
facts revealed a need to create clarity. Said Kabaker: “Our view was, if you could, one, 
create some clarity both of disclosure on what exposure the banks themselves had to the 
different credit assets, and two, create some policy certainty, you had the possibility that 
the private sector would provide capital for that recapitalization.” 
So, said Kabaker, “we set about designing a series of policies that we felt would, with as 
little additional capital injection as possible from the government, create a situation where 
you could have a slightly more self-perpetuating positive cycle of the capital that was in the 
system from the initial preferred injections.” 
These objectives were achieved by the bank “stress tests” that were implemented in early 
2009 and simulated what bank losses were likely to be in various stress scenarios. Test 
results, which also identified any additional capital banks would need to raise to withstand 
the stress scenarios, were disclosed to the public. However, banks undergoing the stress 
tests were assured that, as long as they met certain requirements, the government would 
not fail, resolve, or nationalize them. The government would also provide capital if the bank 
could not raise needed capital from the private sector.  
Kabaker said the stress-test regime was a successful one because of its dual elements: “I 
think the . . . combination of those two things, the private sector understanding that if they 
met the test, the bank would survive in its current form, and understanding what the 
bank’s losses were in tail scenarios, made the sector investable.” And just as important, said 
Kabaker, was the Treasury’s “providing an unlimited backstop to the purchase of common 
equity post stress test; there is no bigger volatility-reducing exercise than that. That is a 
very large put that was written by the federal government.”  
In the end, said Kabaker, the stress tests helped the private sector regain confidence and 
get involved in the recapitalization process. He also thinks they shifted the environment in 
another important way: “Part of the nature of the ‘stress test,’ or the series of policies that 
surrounded the stress test, were designed so that we could get back control of that 
narrative, where there would be one set of policies and it would be clear.”  
This was only achieved, Kabaker said, through collaboration among the different agencies 
and speaking with one voice. He described how one of the Treasury’s roles during the crisis 
was to make sure there was a shared voice between the regulators and that the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), and the 
Federal Reserve did not develop separate and different stress tests. He stated that it was 
important that Treasury communicated that, 
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There is one capital “bogey,” as we called it, and if the banks can meet it, then they 
will have met it, and they can continue to move forward as private companies. 
And although the stress-test strategy succeeded, Kabaker said that there was no way of 
knowing that it would. His team also had a backup plan just in case. To cover all bases, 
explained Kabaker, a placeholder was put in the initial Obama budget to allow policy 
makers to ask for an additional $700 billion for bank resolutions, a strategy which had been 
considered and rejected. The additional funds were never requested because the stress 
tests did the job. According to Kabaker:  
I do not know if that would have been the right policy, but the decision not to pursue 
very large scale bank resolution was, in part, due to the budget constraint. In 
hindsight, the policy that we implemented [broad-based capital injections into 
banks] was probably a lot more efficient than full-scale bank resolution, which is 
what a number of other countries did, such as the U.K. and Ireland.  
The innovation really happened, said Kabaker, “in designing around the constraints. In this 
case, we did have, to some degree, a budget constraint that was, relative to the size of the 
U.S. financial system, modest.” In hindsight, it led to a very effective solution. 
During a crisis, it is important to consider all possible outcomes when deciding on 
intervention policies.  
Kabaker discussed how, in the midst of a crisis, actions that may seem credible may not 
really be and may come with unintended consequences. One example he pointed to from 
the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) was the question of whether the government should seek 
to compromise creditors’ claims when providing assistance to companies. The 
administration was criticized for not requiring creditors of companies receiving assistance 
to take haircuts. However, Kabaker emphasized that the policymakers thought it was 
important to keep all possible results in mind, consider practicalities, and choose the best 
possible outcome for the long-term, not just what might look the best in the short-term: 
If, in the middle of a crisis, you are going to impose losses on someone without 
creating a broader-run dynamic, you have to be able to have a very clear and crisp 
explanation of who is losing and how you can differentiate between different 
creditors and the losses that they take. That was basically an impossible task, 
because the type of creditors in banks, from derivative counterparties to senior 
lenders, were essentially undifferentiated. You would have almost had to create a 
new legal regime in the midst of the crisis, publish it in a way that was easily 
understood, and be able to do that in a way that was not run-accelerating. 
Kabaker said the team thought that task to be “highly impossible” relative to the alternative 
policy they pursued. Remarking on the government’s total response, in which haircuts 
were not required, Kabaker sees a positive: “If you think about it, the U.S. financial crisis 
response was budget positive, meaning it was not only costless, it actually contributed a 
positive surplus.” 
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Managing the politics of crisis response can be extremely demanding because 
perceptions often outweigh practicalities and constraints.  
Kabaker admitted that one perception of the government’s crisis response was that some 
of the “worst offenders” were rescued, which in his opinion was necessary because of the 
unique nature of the U.S. financial system. In the U.S. economy, he explained, instead of a 
central bank or a similar institution, the private financial sector has the job of 
intermediation; it leverages the savings of the economy to drive credit formation and drive 
macroeconomic activity. By the time of the GFC, he explained, half of the U.S. financial 
sector was operated by nonbanks, which were lightly regulated or unregulated. The fact 
that the markets could decide whether or not to engage in financial intermediation, said 
Kabaker, made the intermediation activity unstable, and during the GFC much of this 
intermediation had stopped, resulting in a credit freeze.  
This created a vexing situation, as Kabaker explained:  
Your challenge is how to maintain some level of credit intermediation or lending to 
families and businesses when half of your entire intermediation sector just went on 
strike. They are gone and all you are left with are these banks. Your issue is that 
these are the very institutions whose mistakes caused the financial crisis, and yet, 
now that your markets-based intermediation is gone, all you have are these 
institutions. 
. . . So, my best strategy, absolutely, as politically unpopular and noxious as it is, is to 
make those institutions work. The need of the many, which is the need for credit 
intermediation activity, ends up causing you to have to “bail out” or support these 
institutions. You could let them all fail, but then you have nothing. You have no 
system. You cannot recreate financial intermediation in the middle of a crisis, so you 
have to work with what you have. 
Supporting the country’s financial system as a whole required that those financial 
institutions that did the worst deeds in leading up to the crisis also needed to be supported, 
said Kabaker, who acknowledged the inherent irony:  
. . . it is oftentimes the financial intermediary who did the worst [deeds] who is going 
to be the one that is in the worst trouble. If you need to support the financial sector 
as a whole, by definition, the greatest amount of your support is going to go to the 
institution that did the worst deeds leading into the crisis. It is like some terrible 
cycle of political pain, where the most efficient, best financial crisis response 
becomes assisting the worst offender. A lot of the challenge of financial crisis 
management is managing the politics of that basic reality. 
_____________________________________ 
Dated: November 2021 
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